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This paper studies economies where agents exchange indivisible goods and money. 
Agents have potential use for all indivisible goods and the indivisible goods are differen- 
tiated. We assume that agents have quasi-linear utilities in money, have sufficient money 
endowments to afford any group of  objects priced below their reservation values, have 
reservation values which are submodular  and satisfy the Cardinality Condition.  This 
Cardinality Condition requires that for each agent the marginal utility of  an object only 
depends on the number of  objects to which it is added, not on their characteristics. Un- 
der these assumptions, we show that the set of  competitive equilibrium prices is a non 
empty lattice and that, in any equilibrium, the price of  an object is between the social 
value of  the object and its value in its second best use. 1. INTRODUCTION 
This paper considers economies where agents can buy and sell indivisible goods 
and in which all payments are made :in  units of  a divisible good that, following 
standard use, we  will  call money.  This model is probably closer to many circum- 
stances of  exchange in the real world than the standard model in which all goods 
are assumed to be perfectly divisible, but is also more difficult to analyze.  The 
use of  marginal calculus is  precluded, and the application  of  fixed point  theo- 
rems based on continuity properties, still possible in some cases, is certainly not 
straightforward. In consequence the model has beer! studied under restrictive as- 
sumptions, which are progressively being relaxed. Until recently it was assumed 
either that all the indivisible goods were all units of  the same good (Henry (1970), 
or that buyers had use only for one type of  indivisible good (KanekcYamarnoto 
(1986)), or just for one of  the indivisible goods: this case covers most of  the lit- 
erature on assignment games and matching models (see Roth and Sotomayor for 
a comprehensive account of  the results) and competitive equilibria of  economies 
with indivisibilities (Kaneko (1982), Quinzii (1984), Gale (1984)). Recently sev- 
eral papers (Bikhchandani and Mamer (1994), Van der Laan, Talman and Yang 
(1995), Gul and Stacchetti  (1996)) have relaxed this assumption, and assumed 
that agents have use for several units of  the indivisible goods, units which may 
be differentiated. 
With the exception of  Bikhchandani and Mamer (1994)  who show  that, if 
there are two types of  agents with quasilinear utilities such that all agents of  the 
same type have the same supermodular and increasing reservation values, a com- 
petitive equilibrium exists, all the results of  these papers follow from assumptions 
of  the agents' demand functions rather than on their utility functions.  Van der 
Laan and Talman (1995) impose a condition on agents' demands which seems to require separability of  the utility functions with respect to the indivisible goods 
but not quasi-linearity in money, while Gul and Stacchetti impose that the utili- 
ties be quasi-linear in money and that the demands satisfy the property of  Gross 
Substituability  (to be formally defined in  Section 2)  introduced by  Kelso and 
Crawford (1982) for a two-sided matching model between firms and workers. In 
contrast, this paper studies a class of  economies which is defined by  restrictions 
on the agents'  utility functions.  First, the utilities are quasi-linear in money so 
that the preferences can be represented by  reservation values for subsets of  the 
available indivisible objects. Second, these reservation values are submodular i.e. 
tke marginal utility of an object decreases when the set of  objects to which it is 
added becomes larger. Last and not th.e least, this marginal utility depends only 
on  the number of  objects and not on  the composition of  the set to which it is 
added. 
This last  assumption,  that we  call  the Cardinality Condition, is certainly 
strong.  At the mome~t  however, it is the only interpretable condition that we 
have found which precludes that, for at least one agent, some objects "fit" bet- 
ter together than when they are associated with other objects-a situation which 
seems to cause nonexistence of  an equilibrium even with decreasing marginal utili- 
ties (see the example of  non-existence in Section 2 or the one in Gul and Stacchetti 
(1996)). Under the assumption that utilities are submodular and satisfy the Car- 
dinality Condition we  show that the set of  equilibrium prices is non-empty, is a 
convex complete lattice and thus admits a vector pM of  maximum and a vector pm 
of minimum equilibrium prices.  Moreover these prices have a natural economic 
interpretation:  the maxirrpm price phi(a) of  an object a is the contribution of 
this object to the social welfare, or its social value, while its minimum price pm(a) 
is its value in its second best use (these notions are precisely defined in Section 3). 
The proofs of the papers follow  the route of  the Second Welfare Theorem 
of  Welfare Economics:  we  characterize  the  prices which support  the efficient 
assignments of  the objects, and use  wry few properties of  agents' demands.  In 
particular we  do not  use the property of  Gross Substitutuability, which is the 
basis for  the prooh of  similar  results  by  Gul and Stacchetti (1996), although 
this property is satisfied by the demands of agents whose utility functions satisfy 
our assumptions.  Our  proofs are thus alternative  proofs to those of  Gul  and 
Stacchetti. Being based on the study of  the efficient assignments of  the objects, 
they  uncover  properties of  these efficient assignments  which  are of  interest  in 
themselves, and may  be  used  to obtain results of  comparative statics for  this 
class of  economy (see in particular Lemma 3.3 which describes some regularities 
of  the efficient assignments when new objects are added to the available objects) 
The paper  is organized as follows:  the model  and an example of  nonexis- 
tence of  equilibrium  motivating  the Clardinality Condition  is  presented in Sec- 
tion 2.  The characterization of  the prices supporting  the efficient assignments 
of  economies with submodular  utility functions satisfying the Cardinality Con- 
dition is the subject of  Section 3.  Section 4 discusses the relation  between the 
Cardinality Condition and the property of  Gross Substitutability of  demands. 
2. The Model 
Consider an exchange economy e with a finite set I of agents (whose elements are 
denoted by i, j, ...), a finiteset R of indivisible objects (whose elements are denoted 
by a,  P,  ...),  and a perfectly divisible good called money.  Agents' preferences are 
quasi-linear: the utility that agent i E I derives from consuming a set of objects A 
can be characterized by a reservation due  V(i,  A) which represents the quantity of  money that agent i is ready to  sacrifice in order to consume the objects in A. 
The utility of  agent i holding mi  units of  money and the set A of  objects is thus 
For all  i E I, the reservation value fmction V(i,  .),  defined on the power set 
P(R), is assumed to be weakly increasing (V(i,A) 5 V(i,  B) whenever A c B) 
and to satisfy V(i, 0) = 0. 
Agents' endowments,  with mi  1  0 and uiCl&  = 0,  are assumed 
to be such that mi 2 V(i, fl) for all i E 1'. This assumption implies that whenever 
the price of  a set A of  objects is  less than the reservation value V(i, A), agent i 
can afford to buy the objects in  A. 
Let  E  denote the set of  economies satisfying  tl;.  abwe conditions.  ,'or  an 
economy e  E  E  an  assignment a of  objects to agents is thus a partition of  the 
objects among the agents.  Let C(I,  a)  denote all possible assignments.  A feasible 
-  allocation of  e is a pair (a,  m) E E(I,  0)  x R:'  such that zsEI  m, = CiEl  m,. 
A Pareto optimal allocation is a feasible allocation (a,  m) such that there does 
not exist any other feasible allocation weakly preferred by all agents and strictly 
preferred  by  at least  one agent.  Of  special interest  in  quasi-linear  economies 
in which endowments of  money are such that the nonnegativity constraints on 
money holdings never bind, are the Pareto optimal allocations in which all agents' 
consumption of  money is positive. These are the only Pareto optimal allocations 
which can possibly be obtained as competitive equilibrium allocations.  As is well 
known, they are found by maximizing the sum of  agents' utilities subject to the 
feasibility constraints, In this model they are the feasible allocations associated 
to the assignments which maximize the sum of  the agents'  reservation values. Such an assignment a,  satisfying 
is called an eficient  assignment. 
Suppose  that the objects  are exchanged on  a  market at prices  @(a)),,*. 
(Prices are expressed in units of money). If agent i buys the set A of  objects he 
-  will pay p(A) = CaEA  p(a). The demand of  objects D(i,p) of agent i at the price 
vector p = @(a)),En  is defined by 
D(i,p) =  {A  E  P(R) I V(i,A) -p(A)  2  V(i, B) -  p(B),VB E  P(R)) 
The demand of  agent i for money is then m, = mi  + p(&) -  p(A). This number 
is always non negative since, for A E D(i,p),  V(i, A) -  p(A) 2  0 (the empty set 
is always a possible choice), and since by  assumption mi  2 V(i,R). The price 
vector p is a competitive equilibrium price vector if, for each  i E I,  there exists 
Ai  E  D(i,p) such that the map i --+  A, is an assignment.  By Walras Law, this 
condition,  which ensures equilibrium  on  the market  for  the indivisible goods, 
implies that the market for money is  also in equilibrium.  Thus a competitive 
equilibrium for the economy e can be defined as a pair (o,p) E  C(I,  R) x R~I  such 
that o(i) E D(i,p) for all i E  I. It is easy to check that, if  (alp)  is a competitive 
equilibrium, then a is an efficient assignment. We say that an efficient assignment 
o is supported by a price vector p t  R?'  if  (u,p) is a competitive equilibrium. 
Proposition 2.1. An  economy e E  E  has a competitive equilibrium if and only 
if every efficient assignment a of e can be supported by a price vector. 
/ 
Proof.  If (u,p) is a competitive equilibrium, by definition a is supported by p. 
Suppose that 7 is another efficient assignment.  Then 
V(i, a(i)) -  p(u(i)) 2  V(i,  r(i)) -  p(r(i)), Vi E  I. The pair  (~,p)  is not an equilibrium if  at least one of  the inequalities is strict. 
But then, summing the inequalities leads to 
which contradicts that T is efficient. Thus (r,p) is an equilibrium. 
There exists a competitive equilibrium  if  and only if  there is  at least one 
efficient assignment supported by  a price vector.  By  the above reasoning,  this 
holds if  and only if  every efficient assignment is supported by a price vector. 
The existence of  an equilibrium is  guaranteed (even without the assumption 
of  quasi-linearity of  preferences) if  the a.gents have utility for at most one object 
(V(i,A) = rn-~n  V(i,a)) (  Shapley-Shubik  (1972), Kaneko  (1982), Quinzii 
(1984)) or if all objects are identical (V(i,A) = V(i, /A()  (Henry (1970)). In the 
case where agents can consume several indivisible objects which are not perfect 
substitutes for one another, an equilibrium exists, in the quasi-linear case that 
we  are considering,  if  the reservation  .value functions  are additive  (V(i,A) = 
V(i,  a)). In this case it is efficient to give exh  object to the agent which 
values it most, and the price vector p such that p(a) = maxiE~  V(i,a) supports 
such  an assignment.  The object of  this paper is  to study the case where the 
objects are differentiated but where agents have use for more than one object. In 
this case an equilibrium may not exist (H.enry (1970), Bikchandani-Mamer (1996)) 
and additional restrictions must be placed on the reservation value functions. 
A condition that seems particularly attractive since it expresses, in the case of 
indivisible goods, the idea tbat the marginal utility of an additional item decreases 
when the bundle of  goods to which it is added gets larger, is the assumption of 
submodularity. Definition 2.2.  A  reservation  value function is said  to be submodular if it is 
satisfies for all A,  B in P(R) 
or equivalently 
Unfortunately this assumption is not sufficient to imply existence of  an equi- 
librium, as shown by  the following example. 
Example  1.  Let  e  E  &  be such  that I = {1,2,3), fl  = {a,P,y). The 
submodular reservation  values of  the agents for the different subsets of  objects 
are given in the following table 
The only efficient assignment a of objects in this economy is such that a(1)  = 
P,a(2) = a,a(3)  = y. Suppose that p  supports this assignment.  In order that 
buying {ap)  is not better for  agent  2  tha~  buying only a,  p must be such that 
p(P) 2 5. In order that buying no object is not better for agent  3 than buying 
y, p must be such that p(7) < 8. In order that buying a is not better for agent 
1 than buying p, p must be such that p(a) > p(P) + 2. In order that buying y 
/ 
is not better for agent 2 than buying a, p must be such that p(7) 2 p(a)  + 2. 
Combining these inequalities gives 7 :i  2 +  p(P) I  p  (a)  I  p(7) -  2 < 6, which is 
impossible. Submodularity of  the reservation values still permits complicated interdepen- 
dence in utility among objects, which  prevent the existence of an equilibrium. 
In the previous example, if agent 2 has objects a and 0,  then the marginal contri- 
bution of a is equal to its value V(2, a)  since V(2, ap) -  V(2, P)  = 13 -  5 = 8 = 
V(2,a), while if  objects CY  and 7 are combined the marginal contribution of a is 
much lower:  V(2, cry) -  V(2,7) = 14 -  10 < V(2, a). Thus, for agent 2, having 
object p at the same time does not subtract any of  the value of a while having -y 
lowers the desirability of  a. 
A sufficient condition which ensures that the interdependence among objects 
is weak and that guarantees the existence of  an equilibrium is that the demands 
of  all agents satisfy the Gross Substitute (GS) assumption introduced by  Kelso- 
Crawford (1982). Heuristically the dem.and of  agent i satisfies the GS ccrdition 
if, when the price of  an object -let  us say ,f3 -increases while the prices of  all 
other objects stay the same, then the objects other than p which were demanded 
by agent i are still demanded by  this agent. This implies that there is no object 
which was demanded by agent i because it "fitted" especially well with P,  but is 
no longer desirable when 0 becomes too expensive. To state the formal definition 
of  the GS property, let us adopt the following convention: we  say that the object 
a in the demand of  agent i at prices p if  it belongs to at least one subset of  objects 
demanded by agent i at p. 
a€  D(i,p)wa~A  for some A€  D(i,p) 
Definition 2.3.  The demand of  agent i satisfies the Gross Substitute property 
if for any p E  ~1~1,  and ady  13 E  ~1'1,  ,fi 2 p, with @(a)  = p(a) for some a E a, 
then a E D(i,p) implies a E D(i,p). 
The Gross Substitute property however is not a condition on the primitive characteristics of  the economy (the utility functions  V(i, .)) but a condition on 
the derived demand functions (or more accurately demand correspondences).  In 
this paper we  will study a condition  in the same spirit, which is stronger, but 
is made directly on the utility functions.  The "Cardinality Condition" that we 
impose requires that the marginal contribution of  an object only depends on the 
number of  objects to which it is added.  This condition  prevent interactions in 
utilities among objects-like  objects a  and P fitting especially well  together- 
which create problems for the existence of equilibrium. 
Definition 2.4.  The utility function! V(i,.) satisfies the Cardinality Condition 
if  the marginal contribution  of an  object  to agent i's  utility depends only on 
the number of  objects to which it is added, i.e., for all  A,  B E  P(R) such  tLat 
IAl=IBI ctnda~AnB 
Assumption C makes sense only for indivisible objects which have the same 
function, since otherwise the marginal utility of  an object for an agent depends on 
the composition of  the set of objects to which it is added, not just on its cardinality 
(in particular it depends on whether or not the agent already possesses an object 
performing the same function). However if there are indivisible objects of different 
nature and if  the utility of  the agents  are additive between groups of  objects 
of  different  nature, then each  group  of objects can  be attributed  (auctioned, 
sold) separately. Under the separability assumption, it is sufficient to study "two 
/ 
good" economies with money and indivisible objects which are all of  the same 
nature.  The model studied in  this paper  generalizes, in  the quasi-linear  case 
the two-good model studied by  Henry  (1TO)  to the case where the indivisible 
objects are differentiated.  An  example of  such objects could  be paintings-or more generally art objects-  collected by agents for purpose of  decoration.  The 
objects typically  have different "esthetic values" for different agents, and if  the 
agents are more sensitive to the effect of  each object than to the general effect 
that a group of objects produce together, then the Cardinality Condition can be a 
reasonable approximation. The assumption that the agents' reservation values are 
submodular seems also reasonable in this case, unless some agents are obsessive 
collectors. 
In the following section we  prove that if  the utility functions are submodular 
and satisfy the Cardinality Condition, the set of  equilibrium prices has the lattice 
property found in the matching model:; with quasi-linear utilities. Thus if  pM(a) 
is the maximum value of  object a for any equilibrium and p,(a)  its lowest value 
in any equilibrium, then the vectors pM  and p,  are also equilibrium  prices.  Of 
course pM is the vector of  equilibrium prices which is the most favorable for the 
sellers and p,  the most favorable for the buyers. Moreover the prices pM and p, 
have a natural economic interpretatioin: pM (a) is the social surplus created  by 
object a (to be precisely defined in Section 3) while p,(a)  is the value of a in its 
second best use (also to be defined in ;Section 3). 
Similar properties of  the equilibrium prices have been independently derived 
in a recent  paper by  Gul and Stacchetti (1996) under the assumption that the 
demands of all agents satisfy the Gross Substitute property. However the proofs 
are different in nature from the proofs of  this paper. In the quasi-linear economies 
with large endowments of  money that we  are considering the existence of  equilib- 
rium and the Second Theorem of  Welfare economics (Pareto optimal allocations 
maximizing the sum of akents'  utilities can be supported by  prices) are equiva- 
lent, since the equilibrium prices do not depend on the income distribution (see 
Proposition 2.1). While Stacchetti and Gul call on the properties of  the agents' demand functions to prove existence of  an equilibrium and derive the properties 
of  equilibrium  prices, the analysis of  this paper follows the route of  the second 
Theorem of  Welfare economics and shows that the prices pM  and pm  as well as 
a convex, complete lattice of intermediate prices support the efficient allocations 
of  the objects among the agents. 
3.  Equilibrium Prices 
3.1. Definition of pM  and p, 
The analysis of this section is made under the following set of  assumptions on the 
utility functions which will not be repeated 
ASSUMPTION :  For all  i E I, the utility function  V(i, .) is submodular and 
satisfy the Cardinality Condition 
Let a be an efficient assignment of  the objects C2  to the I agents.  The goal 
of  this section is to derive the prices supporting this allocation of  the objects.  In 
a model with divisible goods and quasi-linear utilities, the prices supporting a 
Pareto optimal allocation are given by  the multipliers associated to the scarcity 
constraints in  the program  of  maximization  of  the sum of  the utilities  (social 
welfare) subject to the feasibility constraints. The envelope theorem then permit 
interpreting the multiplier associated to thc  scarcity constraint for a good (let us 
say good a)  as the change in social welfare resulting from a marginal decrease or 
increase in the supply of  this good.  Suppose now that good a is indivisible and 
exists in a single unit.  If/  we  proceed by  analogy, there are two changes in the 
supply of a which play the role of  a marginal change in the supply of  a when the 
good is divisible: the supply can be decreased by one unit by taking the good a 
out of  the available supply of  goods; or the supply can be increased by one unit by adding a copy of  a to the supply of  available goods.  These changes induce 
changes in social welfare analogous to the changes in social welfare accompanying 
a marginal change in the supply of  a divisible good.  We  will  prove that these 
changes in social welfare define the maximum and minimum prices supporting 
the efficient allocation u. 
Let us thus define the social welfare created by a supply R of  objects by 
U (0) =  (i,  (i)),  for any efficient assignment u  of  R 
iEI 
Define pM  as the change in social welfare when the object a is taken out of 
the available objects, i.e. 
or  alternatively  as  the contribution  of  a to the social  welfare.  To define  the 
minimum prices, for all cr E R let 6 denote an exact copy of  object a. To define 
the social welfare associated to R U  6,  we need to extend the utility functions to 
subsets of  R U 6 containing both a and i5. The extension is made in the following 
way:  if  A is a subset of 0  U ii such that a E A, 6 E A, then V(i,  A) = V(i,  A\ii). 
Thus no  agent benefits from having two copies of  the same object.  With this 
convention, there is always an efficient assignment of  R U 6 which does not give 
a and 6 to the same agent (even if  only one agent has any  use for a,  as long 
as we  assume free disposal).  In all that follows, we  will only consider efficient 
assignments  p of  R U 6 such that p(i)  E R.  In the normal case where several 
agents have a positive utility for a,  an. efficient allocation of  R  U  a!  defines the 
/ 
second best use of  a,  since it becomes possible to give  cr to the agent i who has 
it in an efficient allocation of  R, and to give a copy to the agent who would most 
benefit from a after agent i (see the Remark after Lemma 3.3). If  we define we  can interpret pm(a)  as the social value of  a in its second  best  use.  Define 
pM = (pM(a)),En  and pm = (p,(a)),,~n.  We  first show that pM(a)  and pm(a) 
give respectively the highest and lowest possible equilibrium prices for object a. 
Proposition 3.1. Let a be an efficient assignment of R, and suppose that there 
exists p E  RY' supporting the assignment a. Then for all a E Q,  U(Ru6)  -U(R) < 
~(ff)  I  U(0)  -  U(R\ff). 
Proof.  Since the vector p is supporting the assignment a,  for all i E  I,  and for all 
A E  P(R),  V(i,  a(i))  -  p(a(i))  > V(i,  A) -  p(A).  In particular, given a E Q, lei T 
be an efficient assignment of  R\a  among I,  and let p be an efficient assignment of 
R  U  2i.  As noted above, assume w.1.o.g.  that p(i) E  fl for all i. Then, V(i,  a(i))  - 
P(~(~))  2  V(i,r(i))  -  P(T(~))  and V('il  a(i))  -  P(u(~))  2 V(il  P(~))  -  P(P(~))  for 
all i E I. Summing  up  this inequali.ties, we  get  U(Q) -  p(a) > U(Q\a) and 
U(R)  1 U(R  u  6) -  p(a). 
The next two lemmas will be frequently used in proving that pM  and p,  are 
equilibrium price vectors. 
Lemma 3.2.  Let a and P be two ob-jects  in R  and let C and D be two subsets 
of  R  such that {a,@)  n C = 0 and {a,  p)  n D = 0. Then for all i E  I 
Proof.  Suppose first that 1CI  = /Dl.  Then by  the cardinality condition Subtracting the second equality from the first gives the result. Suppose now that 
ICI  = ID1 -  1.  Then IC  U a1  = IC  U PI  = ID]. The cardinality condition then 
implies 
Subtracting the second inequality from the first gives the result.  Suppose that 
ICI  = ID1 -  2.  Then consider a subset D'  c D such that /CI = ID'l-  1. Applying 
twice the previous step gives 
Thus the property holds if  ICl  < [Dl.  Since C and D play a symmetrical role, 
the property holds for all subsets C and D which do not contain  cr or P. H 
Lemma 3.3. Let a  be an efficient assignment of R to the agents.  For any a E R 
there is  an efficient assignment T  of R'\a  and an efficient assignment p  of R U G 
such that Ir(i)l < (a(i)I  < Ip(i)I for all i E I. Moreover p can be constructed such 
that the agent who has a in the assignment a  also has it in the assignment  p. 
Proof.  Step 1:  Let T be an efficient assignment of  R\a  among I. Partition the 
set I of  agents between the subsets 
I, = {i  E I  I  (r(i)J  > (a(i)(),  I  = {  E I  (i)  = a)}  I3 = {i  E I  (  Ir(i)l < la(i)l) 
and suppose that II is nqt empty, that is for some i E I,  lr(i)l  > la(i)l.  Choose 
an agent i E 11,  There exist P E ~(i)  such that /3  E a(j)  for some agent j  # i. 
Suppose first  that j  E  13, i.e. Ir(.j)  1  < la(j)l.  Consider  a  new  assignment 
r*where agent  j  gets r(j)  U p and agent i gets r(i)\P.  Since  Ir(j)(  < (u(j)(, Ir(j)  u PI  _<  Iu(j)l,  then by submodularity and Assumption C we obtain that 
Since a is an efficient assignment of  C1  among I, 
Since  la(i)l < Ir(i)l, la(i)  UP(  5 lr(i)l,  and by submodularity and Assumption 
c, 
V(i,  ~(i)  U P) -  V(i,  u(z))  > V(z,  ~(2))  -  V(z,  r(i)\P) 
Therefore, 
which proves that the new assignment of  R\a  is as efficient as  I-. If the inequality 
is strict, this is a contradiction with the fact that r is an efficient assignment of 
Q\a  among I. Thus there must be equality, and the new assignment r* obtained 
by shifting P from agent i to agent  j is an efficient assignment of  R\a  among I 
which has decreased by one the number of  objects attributed to the agents of  Il. 
Suppose now  that jr(j)  1  1  la(j)  1 , that is j  E  II U  12.  Then there exists an 
object  Dl  in  ~(j)  which  is  not  in  a(.j) and is  thus in  a(jl)  for some  agent  jl. 
For symmetry of  notation call jo  the agent who has /3  under a (j  = jo) and call 
p = Po.  If  jl  is in I3 then consider the assignment r* obtained by transferring 
to agent jo  and pl  to agent  jl. If  agent jl is in  Il U 12, then continue the 
procedure by finding an !object  P2 in  r(jl)  which is not in o(jl)  and is thus in 
o(j2)  for some agent  jz..  -until an agent of  I3 is reached.  If  the same agent in 
Il U 12  is selected at several stage of  the procedure always choose a new object, 
so that  # P1 # ,B2 # -  - .. This is possible since for these agents lr(i)J  2 la(i)J so that each object which is attributed to i under a and not under r has been 
replaced by a new object. Since I3 is non empty, (there are less objects in R\a 
than in St)  after a finite number of  steps the procedure must stop by  reaching 
an agent jk in 13. Consider the assignment r*obtained by transferring Po from 
i to jo,  P1  from jo to jl,  - . -,  /?k  to  jk.  Note that without loss of  generality we 
can assume that the agents jo,  jl,  .  .  .  ,  jk:  are all different. For if  the same agent is 
chosen at different  stage of  the procedure, i.e.  if, for (2  0, r >  1, je = je+,,  then 
it is possible to choose directly the object j3e+r+l instead of  in r(je) the first 
time that agent je is  reached, avoiding the cycle je,  je+i, -.  - ,  je+r.  Let  us show 
that the assignment  T*  is efficient.  Applying Lemma 3.2 with C = r(je)\pe+1 
and D = a(je)\De gives for agents jo,  .  .  . ,  jk-l 
For agent i, since Ir(i)(  > Iu(i)l, by  the cardinality condition 
v(2,  ~(2)  U  Do) -  V(i,  u(i)) 2  V(i, ~(i))  -  V(i, r(i)\P0) 
Adding up these equalities and inequalitie: leads to where the last inequality is  implied by the efficiency of a. 
Thus as long as an efficient assignment T of  R\a  is such that Il is not empty 
it is possible to construct  another efficient  assignment  T*  with one less object 
attributed to the agents of  Il and one more to the agents of  13. In a finite 
number of  such steps we  must find and efficient assignment  T of  O\a  such that 
Il is empty. 
Step 2:  Consider now an efficient assignment p of  R  U 6 and partition the set 
I into 
If  J1 is non empty, choose an age:nt i in  J1.  There is an object Po which is 
in  a(i) and not in p(i), thus which is in p(jo) for some agent jo.  If jo is in  J3, 
transfer Po  from agent jo to agent  i and stop there.  If  agent jo is in J1 U J2 
there is an object  Dl  which is in u(jO)  and in p(jl) for some agent jl  different 
from jo.  Transfer  from jl  to jo and continue the procedure until an agent of 
J3  is reached which has to happen sin.ce the objects Do,  PI,.  .  . can be chosen to 
be different and some objects must belong to agents of  J3 which is a non empty 
set.  The same type of  equalities/inequalities as in Step 1 show that the new 
assignment of  R U G so obtained  is efficient and gives one more object to the 
agents of  J1. Transferring objects to these ::gents must lead in a finite number of 
step to an efficient allocation of  R  U G for which the set J1 is empty. 
Step 3:  Let  p be an efficient  assig;nment of  R U G,  which, by Step 2, can be 
chosen such that Ip(i)l L, la(i)l for  all i (and also such that p(i) E fl  for all i). 
Let a be the agent who has a  under a. Suppose that Z does not have a under p. 
Then, since  Ip(i)I 2  Iu(?)l there exists an object p in p(a) which is not in a(;) 
and is thus in u(il) for some agent il. If  a  (or a)  E p(il) then exchange a and ,B, i.e. give a (or 5)  to ;  and ,f3  to il. By Lemma 3.2 (with C = p(?)\P, 
for agent i,  C' = p(il)\a, D' = u(il)\P for agent il) 
Adding this equalities and exploiting the optimality of  a leads to 
so that the new assignment is as efficient as p. 
If  cv 4 p(il)  continue following the objects which are assigned in thc 
p  differently than in a:  there exists P1 in  p(il) wlkh is  not in  ~(i 
which is in u(i2)  for i2  # il  . Either a is in p(i2)  in which case the proc 
or there exists p2 in p(i2)  and not in u(iz),  so that ,& is in u(i3) .  .  . Nc 
if the same agent is selected several times, the objects /I, PI, P2, .  .  . c; 
to be different since, each time an object is in a(i) and not in p(i) foi 
i it must have been replaced by a different object. Since there are a fi 
of  different objects, at some point an agent  i,  must be reached suc 
a)  is in  p(i,).  Then replace /3  by a for agent i, PI by  P for agent ; 
for agent i,.  As explained in Stel) 1  he procedure can always 
- 
so that agents i, 21,. . .  ,  i,  are all different.  The same type of  equal 
the simple case where m = 1 considered above, combined with the ( 
u, implies that the assignment so obtained is as efficient as p.  W 
D = a(Z)\a 
I U a) 
assignment 
)  and thus 
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e that even 
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some agent 
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that a (or 
, ...,  cv by 
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;ies than in 
~timality  of 
Remark 1.  The property proved in  Step 3,  namely  that the ag$nt  ?  who is 
I 
assigned a under a also receives a under p, justifies the interpretat,kon of p,(a) 
as the value of a in its second best use:  p attributes the object a tb the agent ? who has it under u and attributes the second copy of a to the agent who, after 
- 
i,  would benefit most of consuming a-perhaps after a reallocation of the other 
objects. 
We now prove that pM and p,,,  are equilibrium prices supporting the efficient 
allocations of  the objects R. 
3.2.  pM supports the efficient assignments of R to I 
Lemma 3.4. Let a be an efficient assignment of R among I. For all i E I 
(i) if a E a(i),  then pM(a)  5 V(i,  a(i))  -  V(i,  a(i)\a) 
(ii) if p 4 u  (i)  , then pM (p)  2  V  (i,  a  (i)  U p) -  V(i,  a  (i)) 
(ii) Let p rj!  a(i),  and suppose that 
then, 
U(R)  < U(R\p) + V(i,  u(i)  U  p) -  V(i,  n(i)) 
By  Lemma  3.3 there  exists  an  assignment,  T, of  R\P  among I such  that 
Ir(i)l 5 lu(i)\,  and by submodularity and Assumption C 
/ 
Then, 
U(R)  < U(R\P) + V(i,r(i)  U  p) -  V(i,r(i))  I U(R) which is a contradiction. 
Lemma 3.5.  For all  i E  I, there is  A  E P(R) such  that JAl = la(i)(  and 
A  E D(i,pM). 
Proof.  (a) Suppose that there is B E D(i,pM)  such that (B(  < la(i)l.  From 
part (i)  of  Lemma 3.4  we  know  that pM (a)  5 V(i,  a(i))  -  V(i,  a(i)\a) for all 
a E a(i).  Since IBI  < la(i)l,  if  a $ B, pM(a)  5 V(i,  B U a)  -  V(i,  B)  so that 
B  U a E ~(i,  pM).  Following this process, we  can add elements to B and obtain 
a set B* such that IB*(  = lo(i)l and B* E D(i,pM). 
(b)  Suppose that there is B  E ~(i,  pM)  such that IBI  > Ia(i)  1.  Then by part (ii) of 
Lemma 3.4 we know that for all P E Bsuch that P $ a(i),  pM(P)  2  V(i,  a(i)uP)- 
V(i,a(i)).  This implies, since IBI  > la-(i)l,  that p-''<($) > V(i,B)  -  V(i,B\P). 
Since B  E  D(i,pM),  it  must  be that pM(j3)  = V(i,B)  -  V(i,B\P), so that 
B\P  E D(i,pM).  Following this process, we  can subtract elements from B and 
obtain a set B* such that IB*l = Iu(i)l and B* E D(i,pM).  H 
Theorem 3.6. If a is an efficient assigmnent of  R among I,  then pM supports 
CT. 
Proof:  In order to prove the thewem, we  must prove that if  a  is an efficient 
assignment of  the objects, then for  all i E  I,  a(i)  E  ~(i,  pM). By Lemma 3.5, 
there exist  A E  D(i,pM)  such that IAl  = la(i)l.  Suppose that A # a(i).  Then 
there exists p E a(i)  such that ,6  $ A and there is a E A such that a 4 a(i).  Let 
us show that A  U /?\a  is also in ~(i,~*). 
Suppose this is not true. Then it must be that V(i,A)  -  pM(A)  > V(i,A  U 
A U P\a),  which is equivalent to pM(P) -  pM(a)  > V(i,A  U P\a)  -  P\a>  -  P  ( V(i,  A).  By Lemma 3.2  (with C = A\a  and D = u(i)\P)  this is equivalent to 
To show that his inequality is implossible, consider an efficient assignment  T 
of  R\a  such that Ir(j)  1  < lu(j)  1  for all. j  E I. By Lemma 3.3 such an assignment 
exists.  In  order  to contradict inequality  (3.1) we  construct  an assignment  of 
R\P  from  T  by  removing the object  P from the agent  who has it  under  T  and 
"appropriately" assigning the object a. 
Consider the agent  jl  who receives  under  T. If  jl  = i,  then take p  from 
agent i and replace it by o. If  jl  # i then since P  E  r(jl)  and P  4  a(jl),  and 
since lr(j1)l I  lu(jl)l,  there is an object P1 in a(jl)  which is not in  r(jl).  If this 
object is either o  or is such that it bel.ongs to ~(i),  then the procedure stops:  in 
the first case replace P by  a in the assignment of  agent jl, in the second replace 
p  by 01  for agent jl  and replace P1 by  cr for agent i. If  ,B1  cannot be either a or 
an object of  ~(i),  then there exists an agent j2 such that Dl  E 7(j2).  By the same 
reasoning ,  since PI 4 u(j2)  there exist an object P2 in a(j2)  which is not in 7(j2). 
If  either this object is a or if it belongs to ~(i),  then procedure stops by replacing 
P by P1 for agent jl, and Pl  by a for agent j2 in the first case,by P2 in the second 
case and h by  a for agent i;  otherwise it continues.  As long as  the procedure 
continues  the objects P1,P2,.  .  . , can 'be chosen so as to be different from each 
other since each time that an object in ~(j)  and not in u(j),  since Ir(j)l 5 Iu(j)l, 
there is a corresponding object in a(j:).  Since there is a finite number of  objects 
the procedure must end finding an agent j,  such that there exists an object P,  in 
/ 
a(j,)  which is either a or is such that @,  E ~(i).  in the first case consider the 
assignment of  R\P  such that p is repllaced by  PI for agent jl, P1 is replaced by 
& for agent j2,. .  . , and Pm-l  is replaced t;.  a: for agent  j,.  In the second case 
p  is replaced by  PI for agent jl, & ils  replaced by  P2 for agent j2,. .  .  ,  is replaced by P,  for agent j,  and P,  is replaced by a for agent i. 9 
agents jl,  . .  .  ,  j,,,  can be chosen so as to be different from each other1 
same agent je  is chosen twice, i.e.  if  for some !  2  1, r 2  1, jl  =  je 
object PL+, can directly be chosen in a(je)  instead of  Pe the first ti 
jc is selected.  We  now use the assignment just constructed to 
the difference U(R\a) -  L7(R\P).  Consider the first case where P, 
By the efficiency of  the assignment a 
he  that the 
since, if  the 
.,,  then the 
:  that agent 
a bound on 
a. 
J 4 
m > 
'm)) 
JP)  +.- 
U  Dm-I) 
which, combined with the previous inequality implies and contradicts (3.1). The proof for the case Dm  E ~(i)  is similar and left to the 
reader.  Note that it covers, with m = 0, the case where 0 E  ~(i). 
Thus inequality (3.1) is impossible so that if  A E ~(i,~~)  is different from 
a(i)  then each object of  A which is not in u(i)  can be replaced by a corresponding 
object of  u(i)  and the new subset obtained in  this way is still in the demand of 
A.  After a finite number of  such replacements the subset u(i)  will  be obtained, 
sa that a(i)  E  D(i,pM).  . 
3.3. p,,,  supports the efficient assignments of R to I 
Lemma 3.7. Let a be an efficient assignment of R among I. For all i E I 
(i)  if a E  a(i),  then p,(a)  5 V(i,a(i))  -  V(i,  a(i)\a) 
(ii) if  $!  a(i),  then p,,,(P) 2  V(i,  ~(i:)  u  p) -  V(i,  a(i)) 
Proof.  (i) Since we  have proved that pM is an equilibrium price, Proposition 
3.1 implies that p,  5 pM.  Since, by  Lemma 3.4, pM  satisfies the inequality (i), 
SO does p,. 
(ii) If  13  $!  o(i),  adding P to the objects of  i creates an assignment of  R U a. 
Thus U(R  U j?)  > U(S2) -  V(i,  a(i))  -t  V(i,  a(i)  U P), which is equivalent to the 
inequality in (ii). W 
Lemma 3.8. For all  i E I, there i,s A E  P(Q)  such  that  IAJ = la(i)l and 
/ 
A E  D(i,  pm)- 
Proof.  The proof is identical to the proof of  Lemma 3.5. 
Theorem 3.9. Ifa  is an efficient assignment of R among I,  then p,,,  supports a. Proof.  Wemust prove that for  alli, a(i) E D(i,p,).  ByLemma3.8, there 
exists  A in  the demand of  agent  i such  that /A(  = la(i)[. Let  us show  that if 
A # a(i),  then every object cw in A and not in a(i) can be replaced by an object 
p in  a(i) and not in A,  so that A uP\tr is in the demand of agent i. By the same 
reasoning than in the proof of  Theorelm 3.6, if  A U ,!?\a  were not in the demand 
of  agent i, then the following inequality would have to hold 
To show that this equality is impossible, choose an efficient assignment p of 
RU~  such that p(j) E 0, Ip(j)l 2  lg(j)l,  for all j E I and such that P E p(i). By 
Lemma 3.3 such an assignment exists. There are two possible cases: 
Case 1:  p assigns p and not a to agent  i.  Thc? considers the assigrment of 
U li obtained in replacing 13  by  cr. 
where the last equality follows from Lemma 3.2 with C = p(i)\P, D = a(i)\P. 
This contradicts inequality (3.2). 
Case 2.  p assigns P and CY  to agent i. Let j be the agent who receives cr under 
a,  and let  k be the agent who receives the copy  of  ,!?  under p.  If  j = k, then 
take P from agent j and replace it by 6. 
where the last equality follows from Lemma 3.2 with C = p(j)\P  and D = a(j)\cr. 
/ 
By efficiency of  the assignment a, This contradicts inequality (3.2).  If  j # I;,  then since a  E  a(j), a $ p(j), and 
lp(j)l ->  la(j)l, there is an object Po  in p(j) which is not in ~(j).  If  this object 
belongs to a(k) or a(i), then the procedure stops: in  the first case replace Po 
by  & for agent  j, and replace  by Po for agent  k.  In the second case replace 
by & for agent j, and replace  by Po for agent i. If  Po is neither in a(k) nor 
in ~(i),  then there is an agent jl such that Po E a(jl). By  the same reasoning, 
since Po  4  p(jl), and Ip(jl)( L  Ia(jl)l, there is an object PI in  p(jl) which is 
not in o(j1).  If PI belongs to a(k) or cr(i), then the procedure stops by replacing 
Po  by  i5 for agent j, P1  by  ,& for agent jl, and  by  for agent  k in the first 
case, and P by  pl  for  agent  i  in  the second case; otherwise  it continues.  As 
long as the procedure continues the objects P1,& ...., can be chosen so as to be 
different from each other since each time that an object  in  a(1) is  not in  p(l), 
and since Ip(l)( 2  la(l)l , there is a corresponding object in p(1). Since there is a 
finite number of objects the procedure must end finding an agent j,  such that 
Pm E p(jm),  and Dm  4 ~(j,),  and such that Dm is in a(k)  or a(i).  In the first case 
consider the assignment of 0  U  i5 such that  is replaced by 6 for agent j, pl is 
replaced by Po for agent jl , P2 is replaced by  P1 for agent jz,  .... ., Pm is replaced 
- 
by  Prn-1 for  agent j,,  and ,B is replaced by  P,  for agent  k.  In the second case 
Po is replaced by  G for agent j, pl is  replaced by  Po for agent jl, fi  is replaced 
by PI for agent j2,  .  .  .. ., Om is replaced by PP,,-l for agent j,,  and  is replaced by 
Dm  for agent i. Note that, as in the proofs of  Lemma 3.3 and Theorem 3.6, we 
can assume w.1.o.g.  that the agents jl,. .  .  ,  j,  are all different. 
We now use the assign,ment  just constructed to find a bound on the difference 
U(O U P) -  U(O U  6). Consider the case where Dm  E a(i). BY  JAXIUKI~  3.2 (with C = p(jl)\Pl  and D  = U($)\P~-~  for  1 = 0,11, ..., m where 
jo =  j, and Po-1  = a,  and C' = p(i)\P, D'  = a(i)\P\Pm  u a) 
I 
By the efficiency of  the assignment a 
which, combined with the previous inequality implies 
I 
and contradicts inequality (3.2). Thus (3.2) is impossible so that if 
is different from a(i) then each object of  A which is not in a(i) ca 
/ 
by a corresponding object of  a(i),  and the new subset obtained in th's way is still  I 
in the demand of  A. After a finite number of  such replacements th  subset a(i)  I 
will  be obtained, so that o(i) E D(i,pm).  The case where om belong to a(k) is 
I 
similar and left to the reader. 3.4. The lattice structure of equilibrium prices 
Theorem 3.10.  The set of prices supporting the efficient assignments of  fl is a 
convex, complete lattice. 
Proof.  The set of prices supporting an efficient assignment a of  Q is the set of 
solutions to the linear inequalities V(i,  a(i))  -p(a(i))  2 V(i,  A) -  p(A),  VA  E R 
and is thus closed and convex. To prove the theorem, we thus only need to prove 
that if  p and p'  are two prices supporting an efficient  assignment a of  R then 
p A p'  and p V p',  defined by  p A p'(cr)  = rnin{p (a)  ,pt  (a)) and p V pt (a) = 
max{p(a),p1  (a)) for  all a  E R, also support a. This arnouncs to showing that 
a(i) E D(i,p  Ap
t) and a(i) E ~(i,p~p')  for all i E I. First note that since,  by 
Proposition 3.1, p,  5 p A p'  5 p vpt 5 pM, the inequalities (i) and (ii) of  Lemma 
3.4 or 3.7 are satisfied by pAp' and p\/p'.  By the same reasoning as in Lemma 3.5, 
this implies that, for all i there exist Ai in D(i,  p Apt) and A:  in D(i,  p v p')  such 
that (Ail = IA:l  = la(i)l. Suppose that, for some agent i, Ai # a(i). Then there 
exists a such that a E Ai and cu $ a(i), and there exists p such that p E ~(i)  and 
p 4 A,.  Let  us show that A;\a  U p is also in  D(i,p A p').  By Lemma 3.2 (with 
C = A\a and D = u(i)\P) and the fact that p and p'  support a 
where the last inequality can easily be checked case by case.  Thus the objects of 
Ai which are not in a(iJ  can be replaced by  objects of  a(i), which proves that 
a(i) E D(i,pAp1).  The same reasoning applied to  A: shows that a(i) E D(i,pvpl). 
Thus the set of  prices supporting the assignment a is a lattice, and being closed, 
it is complete. Note that choosing prices independently for each object a between pM(cr) and 
p,  (cr) does not generally lead to a vector of  equilibrium prices, as shown by the 
following example: 
Example 3.11. : Let e  E  E  be such  that I = (1,2,3),  R = {a,P,7). The 
reservation values of  the agents for the different subsets of  objects are given in 
the following table: 
For this economy the efficient assignment is  u(1) = {aP),u(2) = 0,a(3) = {y). 
The vectors pM and p,  are 
The price vector p = (4,7,7) however  is  not  an equilibrium price vector since 
at these prices agent 3 would demand object a and not object y. The prices of 
objects need  to be compatible:  in  particular the surplus of  agent 3 on  object 
y  has to be as least  as large as on  objects a. The set  of  equilibrium prices is 
((4  +  &, 7,  ~(7))  1 6 < ~(7)  I  mi46  +  E., 7)),  0 I  E. 5 3). 
4. Relation between the Cardinality Condition and Gross Substi- 
tut  ability  / 
We mentioned in the Introduction and in Section 2 that, for submodular reserva- 
tion values, the Cardinality Condition implies that agents' demands satisfy the Gross Substitute property. We now formally prove this claim. The proof uses the 
following properties of  agents'  demands when their  reservation value functions 
satisfy submodularity and the Cardinality Condition. 
Lemma 4.1.  Suppose that the reservation value V(i,  -) of agent i is submodular 
and satisfies the Cardinality Condition.  Then 
(i)  If A and B are two subsets of D(i,p),  and if  IBI  < [At,  then for every a 
such that a E A, a $!  B,  then B  U a is in D(i,p) 
(ii) If p and p'  are two vectors of prices such that p'  2 p, if A is a subset of 
D(i,p)  of maximum cardinality, then for all B E G(i,p'),  IBI  < IA(. 
Proof.  (i) IBI  < IAJ implies  )B  U  trl  5  IAl  SO  that V(i,  B U a)  -  V(i,  B) 2 
V(i,  A) -  V(i,  A\a)  2 p (a)  , where the last inequaiity comes from the fact that 
A E D(i,p).  Thus the surplus of  agent i with the objects of  B  U a is at least as 
large as with the objects of  B,  so that B  U a E D(i,p). 
(ii) Suppose IBI  > IA(.  Then there exists  P such that P  E B,  /3  $!  A. Since 
IA  u  Dl  i  IBI  ,  v(i,A  u  P) -  v  (2, A) 2: v(i,  B\D)  -  v(i,  B)  2 pl(P) 2 p(P). Thus 
A  UP  is  in D(i,p),  which contradicts the assumption that A has the maximum 
number of  elements among the subsets of  D(i,p).  W 
Proposition 4.2.  Suppose that the reservation value V(i,  .)  of agent i is sub- 
modular and satisfies the Cardinality Condition.  Then agent it s demand satisfies 
the Gross Substitute property. 
Proof. Let p'  be a price +ector such tlhat p'  2 p and let a be an element of D(i,p) 
such that p(a) = p'  (a).  By Lemma 4.1  (i), there is a subset  JAJ  of  maximum 
cardinality among the subsets of  D(i,p)  such that a E A. Let B E D(i,p
l).  By 
Lemma 4.1 (ii), IBJ 5 [A!.  If  cr $!  B and (BJ  < /A(,  then V(i,  B  U a)  -  V(i,  B)  > V(i,A) -  V(i,A\a) t  p(a) = #(a), so that B U o E D(i,$).  11 a 6 B and 
lAl = 1B1, there exist /3  E B, /3  $!  A. By Lemma 3.2, V(i,  B\P U aj -  V(i,  B) = 
V(i, A) -V(i, A\au,D) 2 p(a)-p(P)  2  pl(a)-p'(0)  where the last t  o inequalities  4 
come from the facts that A is at least as desirable at prices p than b\a u P, that 
I 
p(a) =$(a),  and p'  (B) t  p(P). Thus B\,D U a E  D(i,p
l) so that a E D(z,p'). 
The reverse proposition is not true:  the GS property on  demQd holds for 
reservation value functions which do not satisfy the Cardinality C  ndition.  For  0 
example it holds for the reservation value functions V(i, A) = max(~(i,  a), a t 
A),  which correspond to the case where agants have use for only obe object. In 
this paper we  are interested in  the case where the agents are alw  ys willing to  4 
purchase one more object if  the price is sufficiently low, i.e.  to situations where 
I 
the marginal utility of  every object is always positive. MTe have not succeeded in 
characterizing all reservation value functions which lead to the   robs Substitute 
property, so that we do not know if  they involve functions with a natural economic 
interpretation, other  than the ones satisfying  the Cardinality Co  dition.  It is  n 
clear on simple examples that the Gross Substitute property allow fpr more "free 
parameters" in constructing the reservation value functions than thh Cardinality 
Condition.  If  we  come back to the example of  Section 2 for  which there is  no 
equilibrium, and modify it to obtain existence of  an equilibrium, th n in order to 
have the Cardinality Condition satisfied, w? can keep the same rese  tion values  L 
for  objects a,P,7 and the reservation values for  one of  the subsdts composed 
of  two objects (for example we  keep the numbers in the column PI). Then the 
choice of  numbers in this column determine all other reservation val  es for groups 
of  two objects (since the riiarginal contribution of  a and 7 to one-  bject subsets  :: 
are determined).  The values  for the three-object subset a& ar# then  "free" 
parameters  (subject to the submodularity condition and monoton/city, that we have not used in the proofs, but is a na'tural  assumption to require). For example, 
if we  keep the same values for V(i,  P U 7) as in the original example, then the 
reservation values table must be 
If  we only  require that the demands satisfy the Gross Substitute property, 
then the only  restrictions on  the agents'  reservation values for subsets of  two 
objects are as follows:  if V(i, a1 U a?) -  V(i,  a2)  < V(i,  (1.1 U a3) -  V(i,  a3)  then 
it must  be that V(i, al  U a3) -  V(i, trl) = V(i,a2 U as) -  V(i, a2).  For if, for 
example, we  had  V(i,al U as) -  V(i,al) > V(i,a2 U as) -  V(i,a2) then for 
prices p such  that V(i, a1  U a?) -  V(i,  a2) < p(a1) < V(i,al U a3) -  V(i,  as), 
T'(i,  a2  ~a3)  -  V(i,  a2) < p (ag) < V(i, a1 Ua3) -  V(i,  al)  and V(i,  a2)  -p(a2) = 
V(i, a1 ~a3)  -p(al) -p (as), agent i 's  demand would consist of  the  sets {al,  as) 
and (02)- If  the price p(a1) slightly increases '  then the demand reduces to {a2), 
which violates the Gross Substitute property.  A similar reasoning eliminates the 
possibility that V(i, a1 ua3)  -  V(i, al)  < V(i,  a2  ua3) -  V(i,  a2).  Thus, when the 
column V(i, p U  7)  is chosen, there are stil! some degrees of freedom for choosing 
the values of  V(i, a U p) and V(i,  a U.7) compatible with the GS property of  the 
demand. For example, we could keep the two columns a7  and P7 of  the original 
'  in such a way  that the inequality p(a1) <:  V(i,  a1 U a3) -  V(i,  a3)  which ensures that aa  is 
not in the demand, still hold$ table, and the table of  numbers has just to be modified so as to  satisfy 
Thus there are more "free"  parameters with the GS assumption than with 
the Cardinality Condition.  It would be interesting to characterize all reservation 
functions which  lead  to demands satisfying  the GS property,  in  order  to find 
which interpretable restrictions on the preferences of  the agents are compatible 
with the GS property.  Hopefully, future research will provide an answer to this 
quest ion. 
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